Quantum computing

Fault-tolerant quantum computing

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10/08/2023



HELMHOLTZ RESEARCH FOR GRAND CHALLENGES

Who am I?

Data analysis		Reconstruction techniques	Detector instrumentation
2011 - 201 University	4 PhD studies of Milano	2018 - current Staff s DESY	cientist
1 year	2014 - 2017 Postdoctoral researcher 2017 - 2018 "Oberassistent" University of Bern		Today Time
Software and computing		Phenomenology	Education

Introduction

A useful Quantum Computer needs to be:

- Universal and General Purpose: not limited to a single class of problems
- Accurate: probability of error on the output can be arbitrarily small
- Scalable: resource requirements do not grow exponentially in the size of target error probability of the computation

Building Quantum Computers is challenging:

- Quantum information is inherently fragile
- Not a pure engineering problem: understanding the underlying physics still matters a lot!
- Current devices are noisy. We don't expect quantum devices to be as good as classical transistors for information processing



Where are we?



Fault-Tolerant quantum computers aim to achieve a useful quantum computer given imperfect devices underneath

- Using encoded quantum data will require O(1000) more physical qubits
- The small devices available today serve as demonstrators for theoretical concepts (e.g., error correction) applicable to more reliable platforms

Fault-tolerant classical computing

A fault-tolerant computing protocol maintains general purpose computations efficiently in the presence of faults during the computation

Computational Model: circuits in which each gate has exactly one output

Noise Model: ideal gates followed by a **bit flip with probability p**

Goal:approximate the ideal circuit to precision ε using faulty
gates

Approach:

encode the data and process it with encoded gates which suppress the spread of errors



The classical threshold theorem

A g-gate ideal circuit can be simulated to precision ϵ by an O(g log (g/ ϵ))-gate faulty circuit

von Neumann,

Automata Studies. (AM-34), 1956

• As long as gate error $p < p_c$, the accuracy threshold for classical computation

The quantum threshold theorem

A quantum circuit is fault-tolerant against t failures if failures in t elements results in at most t errors per code block (group of qubits corrected together)

There exists a physical error probability p_c below which an arbitrary quantum computation can be performed efficiently

- 2-input gate accuracy threshold [0802.1464]
- At k levels of encoding, the effective error rate P_L scales as p_c (p/p_c)^{2k}.
 For a computation of length N, we need log (log N) levels of encoding

How can we achieve fault tolerant QC?

A series of problems seem to prevent the possibility of fault-tolerant quantum computing:

- The no-cloning theorem
- The collapse of the state after measurement
- Unitary operations are continuous (not discrete)

Despite these problems, **quantum error correction is possible** (I'll give just one example, you'll see more details in Jeanette's lecture tomorrow)

• We can use methods from classical error correction



Classical bit flips

We can use redundancy to code the information

 $0 \rightarrow 000$ $1 \rightarrow 111$

We use majority voting to "correct" errors

000, 001, 010, 100 → 000

111, 110, 101, 011 \rightarrow 111

In this way, we can correct errors that affect only a single bit

Quantum bit flips

We can extend the previous idea to the quantum domain

We use three qubits to code one

 $|0\rangle \rightarrow |000\rangle$ $|1\rangle \rightarrow |111\rangle$

By linearity

$$\alpha \mid \! 0 \rangle + \beta \mid \! 1 \rangle \! \rightarrow \alpha \mid \! 000 \rangle + \beta \mid \! 111 \rangle$$

It does NOT violate the no-cloning theorem

The circuit for encoding is simple



We can detect qubit flips without measuring them by using additional qubits

 $\begin{array}{ll} \left| 000 \right\rangle, \left| 111 \right\rangle \rightarrow \left| 00 \right\rangle & \left| 001 \right\rangle, \left| 110 \right\rangle \rightarrow \left| 01 \right\rangle \\ \left| 010 \right\rangle, \left| 101 \right\rangle \rightarrow \left| 10 \right\rangle & \left| 100 \right\rangle, \left| 011 \right\rangle \rightarrow \left| 11 \right\rangle \end{array}$

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We can measure the additional qubits and apply an error correction operation:

|00> = all good |01> = invert the third qubit|10> = invert the second qubit |11> = invert the first qubit Quantum Fourier Transform

QFT != Quantum Field Theory

Now, let's assume we had an ideal quantum computer. What could we do with it?

The Quantum Fourier Transform (QFT) is widely used in quantum computing A general quantum state $|\varphi\rangle$ on *n* qubits can be written

$$|\varphi\rangle = \sum_{j=0}^{2^n-1} a_j |j\rangle_n = \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} a_j |j\rangle_n$$
 for $N = 2^n$

There are *N* amplitudes a_j corresponding to the *N* standard basis kets $|j\rangle$ For a fixed $|\varphi\rangle$, we get a complex-valued function where $a(j)=a_j$, with $1 = \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} |a_j|^2$

The quantum Fourier Transform of $|\varphi\rangle$ is

$$\mathbf{QFT}_n: |\varphi\rangle = \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} a_j |j\rangle_n \to \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} b_j |j\rangle_n \quad \text{with} \quad b_j = \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}} \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} a_k \omega^{jk} \text{ and } \omega = e^{\frac{2\pi i}{N}}$$

In matrix form

$$\mathbf{QFT}_{n} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \cdots & 1\\ 1 & \omega & \omega^{2} & \omega^{3} & \cdots & \omega^{N-1} \\ 1 & \omega^{2} & \omega^{4} & \omega^{6} & \cdots & \omega^{2(N-1)} \\ 1 & \omega^{3} & \omega^{6} & \omega^{9} & \cdots & \omega^{3(N-1)} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 1 & \omega^{N-1} & \omega^{2(N-1)} & \omega^{3(N-1)} & \cdots & \omega^{(N-1)(N-1)} \end{bmatrix}$$

In matrix form (after some massaging)

$$\mathbf{QFT}_{n} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \cdots & 1 \\ 1 & \omega & \omega^{2} & \omega^{3} & \cdots & \omega^{N-1} \\ 1 & \omega^{2} & \omega^{4} & \omega^{6} & \cdots & \omega^{N-2} \\ 1 & \omega^{3} & \omega^{6} & \omega^{9} & \cdots & \omega^{N-3} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 1 & \omega^{N-1} & \omega^{N-2} & \omega^{N-3} & \cdots & \omega \end{bmatrix}$$

Interesting fact: for n = 1

$$\mathrm{QFT}_1 = rac{1}{\sqrt{2}} egin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \ 1 & (-1)^1 \end{bmatrix} = rac{1}{\sqrt{2}} egin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \ 1 & -1 \end{bmatrix} = \mathrm{H}$$

but this is not true in general!

QFT circuit



The circuit in the figure implements the QFT

- The R gates in the circuit are what we call $R_7(2\pi/2^k)$
- The number of gates is **quadratic in m**, an exponential speed-up over the classical case (FFT)

Two properties of the QFT will be very useful in a moment:

- Shift-invariance (up to an unobservable phase)
- QFT transforms sequences with period r into sequences with period M/r (where M = 2^m)

Shor's algorithm

Introduction

Shor's algorithm is, probably, the most famous quantum algorithm

- It finds a factor of a n-bit integer in time O(n²(log n)(log log n))
- The best classical algorithm that we know of for the same task needs time O(e^{cn/3 (log n)2/3})
- Dramatic consequences for current cryptography (RSA)



Drawing taken from: @MinutePhysics

How does RSA work?

RSA is a security protocol to allow others to send you secure communications.

- You publish a public key used to encrypt these messages intended for you. Anyone who has access to the key can use it.
- There is an additional key, your private key. You and only you have it. With it you can decrypt and read the encrypted messages.

Public key: a pair of numbers (*e*, *n*), with *n* an integer (product of two primes)

Private key: a pair of numbers (*d*, *n*), with the same *n* as the public key

$$(m^e)^d \equiv m (\mathrm{mod}\;\mathrm{n})$$

Knowing e and n, or even m, it can be extremely difficult to find d

1. Choose two distinct prime numbers (p=61 and q=53), n = pq = 3233.

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- Choose any number 1 < e < 780 that is coprime to 780.
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The public key is (n = 3233, e = 17). The encryption function is

 $c(m) = m^e \mod n = m^{17} \mod 3233$

The private key is (n = 3233, d = 413). The decryption function is

 $m(c) = c^{d} \mod n = c^{413} \mod 3233$

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For the message m = 65: $c(m) = 65^{17} \mod 3233 = 2790$ $m(c) = 2790^{413} \mod 3233 = 65$

What if we could compute your private key from the public key?

The algorithm

- 1. Given N, check that N is not a prime or power of a prime. If it is, stop.
- 2. Choose 1 < a < N at random
- 3. If b = gcd(a, N) > 1, output b and stop
- 4. Find the order of a mod N (r >0 such that $a^r \equiv 1 \mod N$)
- 5. If r is odd, go to 2
- 6. Compute

$$x = a^{r/2} + 1 \mod N$$
 $y = a^{r/2} - 1 \mod N$

- 7. If x = 0, go to 2. If y = 0, take r = r/2 and go to 5.
- Compute p = gcd(x,N) and q = gcd(y,N). At least one of them will be a non-trivial factor of N

Every step, apart from 4 can be carried out efficiently on a classical computer. For step 4, there exists a circuit with a number of gates which is polynomial in n (the number of bits of N)









Example

If a = 2, N = 5, m = 4, we would have

 $1/4 (|0\rangle |1\rangle + |1\rangle |2\rangle + |2\rangle |4\rangle + |3\rangle |3\rangle + |4\rangle |1\rangle + \ldots + |15\rangle |3\rangle)$

and when we measure we could obtain, for instance

 $1/2 (|1\rangle |2\rangle + |5\rangle |2\rangle + |9\rangle |2\rangle + |13\rangle |2\rangle)$

Note that the values of the first register are exactly 4 units apart and that

 $2^4 = 1 \mod 5$

In general, we will obtain values that are r units apart, where a^r =1 mod N



Properties of the QFT:

- Shift-invariance
- QFT transforms sequences with period r into sequences with period M/r (where M = 2^m)



Quantum phase estimation



Suppose we are given a unitary operation U and one of its eigenvectors $|\psi\rangle$

- We know that there exists $\theta \in [0, 1)$ such that $U |\psi\rangle = e^{2\pi i \theta}$
- We can estimate θ with the circuit shown above

The circuit before the QFT will prepare $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^m}} \sum_{k=0}^{2^m-1} e^{2\pi i \theta k} |k\rangle$ By using the inverse QFT we can measure j $\approx 2^m \theta$

Shor's algorithm case

The circuit used in Shor's algorithm is a case of quantum phase estimation

• The (unitary) operation of modular multiplication by a has eigenvalues

$$e^{2\pi i \frac{k}{r}}$$
 $k=0,\ldots,r-1$

where r is the period of a

• It is not easy to prepare one of the eigenvectors $|\psi_k\rangle$ of the unitary operation

• But we use the fact that
$$|1\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{r}} \sum_{k=0}^{r-1} |\psi_k\rangle$$

- We will get a random integer of the form $k/r 2^{2m}$ for random k = 0, 1, ..., r-1
- We can then re-run the quantum subroutine several times to extract r
- Internet security is now destroyed

Grover's algorithm

(time-dependent bonus / might skip)

Introduction

Grover's algorithm is used to solve search problems

- Imagine we have an unsorted list of N elements
- One of them verifies a certain condition and we want to find it
- Any classical algorithm requires O(N) queries to the list in the worst case
- Grover's algorithm can find the element with $O(\sqrt{N})$ queries



The oracle function

We are given a circuit (an oracle) that implements a one-bit boolean function

An oracle is treated as a black box, a circuit whose interior we cannot know

- This circuit computes, in a reversible way, a certain function f
- For the computation to be reversible, it uses as many inputs as outputs and "writes the result" with an XOR

The oracle computes the function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \Rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ (with $N = 2^n$)

• The element we want to find is the one that verifies f(x) = 1



The strategy

The quantum search algorithm is based on the idea of inversion about the mean



Image credits: quantumcomputing.stackexchange.com

Using the oracle to negate the amplitude

We create the state $| 0 \dots 0 \rangle | 1 \rangle$

We use Hadamard gates to create the superposition

$$\sum_{x\in\{0,1\}^n}\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^{n+1}}}\ket{x}\left(\ket{0}-\ket{1}\right)$$

We apply the oracle, getting

$$\sum_{x\in\{0,1\}^n}rac{1}{\sqrt{2^{n+1}}}\ket{x}\left(\ket{0\oplus f(x)}-\ket{1\oplus f(x)}
ight)=\ \sum_{x\in\{0,1\}^n}rac{(-1)^{f(x)}}{\sqrt{2^{n+1}}}\ket{x}\left(\ket{0}-\ket{1}
ight)$$



Grover's algorithm $O(\sqrt{N})$



Grover's algorithm performs $O(\sqrt{N})$ iterations, each one consisting of two steps

- The oracle "marks" those states that verify the condition
- The diffusion operator "amplifies" the amplitudes of the marked states

Reflection x Reflection = Rotation



If we denote by $|x_1\rangle$ the marked element, the initial state of the upper n qubits is

$$\sqrt{\frac{N-1}{N}} |x_0\rangle + \sqrt{\frac{1}{N}} |x_1\rangle$$
$$\sin \theta$$

If D is the diffusion operator and $G = DO_{f}$

• G acts on the 2-dimensional space spawned by $|x_0\rangle$ and $|x_1\rangle$ as a rotation of angle 20

After m iterations:

 $\cos((2m+1)\theta |x_0\rangle + \sin((2m+1)\theta |x_1\rangle)$

In order to obtain $|x_1\rangle$ with high probability when we measure we need

$$(2m+1) hetapprox rac{\pi}{2}$$

The solution

When we measure, we will obtain x such that f(x) = 1 depending on:

- The number m of iterations
- The fraction of values x that satisfy the condition

If we perform too many iterations, we can overshoot and not find a marked element

It can be shown that no other quantum algorithm can obtain more than a quadratic speed-up over over classical algorithms in the same setting

Conclusions



Summary

Discussed the concept of fault-tolerant quantum computing

• Gave one example of error correction

Discussed some of the most famous quantum algorithms

- Quantum Fourier Transform
- Shor's algorithm
- (maybe) Grover's algorithm

Hands-on demonstrations:

- Shor's algorithm
- Grover's algorithm



Thank you!